The hidden world of anti-Putin sabotage has come under renewed attention following a BBC Eye investigation published on October 19, 2026. The report features two Russian men who say they have supported Ukrainian military intelligence operations targeting Russian military assets and personnel during the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine.
The investigation, produced by independent Polish journalist Marcin Mamon, offers a rare look into the people who claim to work covertly for Ukraine while opposing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s government. One source, identified by the pseudonym Ivan, says he has operated inside Russia. The other, known as Foma, lives in exile in Poland and describes coordinating a network of volunteers.
Their accounts provide insight into the reported world of anti-Putin sabotage, intelligence gathering and clandestine resistance. However, the claims require careful interpretation. The BBC reports that Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, known as the GUR, confirmed that both men work with the agency, but it could not independently verify every operation they described.
The investigation therefore raises important questions about the reach of Ukrainian intelligence, the motivations of Russian opponents of the war and the risks associated with covert activity inside Russia.
What Is Anti-Putin Sabotage?
The term anti-Putin sabotage broadly describes covert activity intended to undermine the Russian government or its military capabilities by people who oppose Putin’s leadership or Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Such activity can include intelligence gathering, surveillance, logistical support and, in some cases, assistance connected to attacks on military infrastructure. These activities are not all the same: collecting information is different from planning an attack, and neither automatically establishes responsibility for a particular incident.
In the BBC investigation, Ivan describes helping identify military sites and preparing locations associated with drone components. Foma says his volunteers collect information about military officers and other potential targets for Ukrainian intelligence to assess.
The report does not establish that every operation attributed to these networks succeeded. Instead, it presents accounts from people who claim to have participated in a clandestine campaign against Russian military capabilities.
The distinction is important because anti-Putin sabotage operates in an environment where information is difficult to verify, participants conceal their identities and governments may have strategic reasons to withhold details.
Who Are Ivan and Foma?
Ivan: An alleged operative inside Russia
Ivan is the pseudonym used for a Russian man who says he has helped Ukrainian intelligence from within Russia. According to the BBC, he previously participated in political opposition activity and describes his involvement in the war as motivated by opposition to Putin’s government.
Ivan says his work has included observing military facilities and helping identify locations associated with potential operations against Russian military assets. He also provided the journalist with video footage that apparently showed him concealing explosives near a Russian military airfield.
The BBC could not independently establish every detail of Ivan’s account. His identity is concealed, and the investigation does not disclose enough operational information to verify all the activities he described.
Nevertheless, his testimony illustrates the personal risks associated with alleged anti-Putin sabotage inside Russia. Ivan says discovery could result in terrorism charges and a lengthy prison sentence.
He also describes living with persistent fear, even when he is not actively carrying out an assignment. His account suggests that the psychological burden of covert work can extend beyond individual operations.
Foma: Coordinating volunteers from Poland
Foma is a Russian living in exile in Poland. Unlike Ivan, who says he operates inside Russia, Foma describes coordinating volunteers remotely and providing information to Ukrainian intelligence.
He says his network monitors senior military personnel and collects information that may be relevant to Ukrainian intelligence assessments. According to the investigation, the network includes people in Russia, Ukraine and other parts of Europe.
Foma told the BBC that his group does not carry out assassinations itself. He characterises its role as gathering and passing on intelligence, leaving decisions about possible targets and operations to others.
That distinction is central to understanding the reported anti-Putin sabotage network. Intelligence gathering can support military decisions, but evidence that someone collected information does not, on its own, establish that the person planned or executed a subsequent attack.
Foma also says that his team independently reviews information about people it considers responsible for actions in Ukraine. His statements describe how he views the network’s purpose, rather than independently verified evidence of the accuracy of every allegation against those being monitored.
Alleged Links to Attacks on Russian Military Assets
One of the most significant aspects of the investigation is Ivan’s claim that he played a role in activity connected to Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian strategic bombers and munitions facilities.
Ukraine has used long-range drones against targets inside Russia during the war. Kyiv has described some of these operations as attempts to weaken Russia’s military capacity, including facilities and equipment connected to attacks on Ukrainian territory.
Ivan claims that his work involved reconnaissance and preparation intended to support operations against military assets. However, the BBC says it could not independently verify all of his claimed activities.
The investigation also discusses a reported attack on a major Russian military drone factory at Yelabuga in June 2025. Foma said he believed Ivan may have been involved in a plan connected to that incident, after consulting contacts. That assessment is not the same as independent confirmation that Ivan participated in the attack.
The case illustrates why anti-Putin sabotage stories must be reported with precise attribution. An interviewee’s account, an intelligence agency’s confirmation of a working relationship and independent verification of a specific attack are three different levels of evidence.
Readers should therefore distinguish between what the men say they did, what Ukrainian authorities acknowledge and what the available evidence establishes independently.
The Killing of General Fanil Sarvarov
The BBC investigation also examines information Foma says his network supplied about Russian Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov.
Sarvarov was killed in Moscow in December 2025 by an explosive device concealed under his car, according to the reporting. Foma later acknowledged that his network had provided Ukrainian intelligence with information about the general before his death.
Foma described the surveillance as difficult, saying Sarvarov changed his schedule and took steps to conceal his movements. The BBC did not report that Foma had provided the journalist with an advance account of the killing.
The information raises questions about how intelligence gathered by private networks may be used in wartime. It does not, by itself, prove that Foma or his volunteers planned or carried out the assassination.
Ukraine has not routinely publicly claimed responsibility for targeted attacks inside Russia. The BBC also notes that a Ukrainian intelligence officer previously acknowledged Ukrainian involvement in the December 2024 killing of Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov.
These incidents form part of the broader context surrounding anti-Putin sabotage, but each case requires its own evidence. Similarities in methods or targets do not establish that the same individuals or organisations were responsible.
How Large Is the Anti-Putin Sabotage Network?
The scale of the reported activity remains uncertain.
Foma estimated that between 300 and 500 Russians may be involved in this type of work supporting Ukraine. The BBC says that figure could not be independently verified.
Foma also described a smaller network of approximately three dozen people spread across Russia, Ukraine and other parts of Europe. According to his account, some participants provide logistical support from outside Russia.
These figures should not be treated as confirmed totals. They come from a source involved in the activity, and the investigation does not provide independent evidence establishing the overall size of the alleged network.
The difference between a broader estimate of people involved in similar work and the number within one specific network is also important. The two figures describe different claims and cannot be combined into a reliable count.
Even so, the accounts suggest that alleged anti-Putin sabotage is not necessarily limited to a single individual operating alone. The investigation describes a mix of people inside Russia, contacts abroad and volunteers who reportedly contribute information.
Trust and the Risks of Double Agents
A striking part of the BBC report concerns uncertainty over whether Ivan can be trusted.
The journalist spoke with one of Ivan’s Ukrainian intelligence handlers, who confirmed contact with him but acknowledged that it was impossible to rule out the possibility that Ivan might also be cooperating with Russian security services, either voluntarily or under pressure.
That uncertainty highlights a fundamental problem in clandestine intelligence work. A source may provide useful information while concealing other relationships, motives or vulnerabilities. Confirming contact with an intelligence service does not automatically verify everything the source says.
For an alleged anti-Putin sabotage operative, the risks can run in both directions. Russian authorities may suspect collaboration with Ukraine, while Ukrainian handlers must assess whether the information they receive is accurate and whether the source is compromised.
Ivan says he has travelled outside Russia and returned despite the risks he associates with his activities. Foma argued that gaps in the system could explain such movement, but this remains his interpretation rather than proof of Ivan’s reliability.
The uncertainty is a reminder that intelligence reporting often involves incomplete information, competing explanations and evidence that cannot be made public without exposing sources.
Why Russian Opponents of the War Become Involved
Ivan and Foma say they oppose both Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Putin’s political system. Ivan believes the government’s future is linked to the outcome of the war and says he hopes his actions will accelerate political change.
Their stated motivations reflect one strand of Russian opposition to the invasion. However, the experiences of two interviewees cannot establish how widespread these views are among Russia’s population.
People who oppose a government can choose very different responses, including public protest, journalism, political organising, emigration or private acts of resistance. Covert intelligence work represents a particularly risky form of involvement and should not be taken as representative of all anti-war Russians.
The investigation also describes a changing environment for potential recruits. Ivan says many people who once might have participated in opposition activity have left Russia or been imprisoned. The BBC reports that some individuals involved in related operations may be paid or may unknowingly contribute to activities supporting a wider operation.
These observations are difficult to measure independently, but they underline the varied motivations and circumstances that may exist within clandestine networks.
What the Investigation Means for the Russia-Ukraine War
The BBC report offers a rare view of alleged intelligence activity behind the front lines. It suggests that the conflict involves more than conventional fighting: intelligence gathering, information networks and covert support may also shape military operations.
For Ukraine, information about military facilities and personnel can potentially support planning and assessment. For Russia, suspected collaboration with Ukrainian intelligence presents a security challenge and a potential basis for criminal investigations.
Yet the impact of the reported anti-Putin sabotage networks cannot be measured from the interviews alone. The investigation does not establish the number of operations successfully supported by the men, the overall military effect of their work or the extent to which their claims match classified records.
It also raises questions about accountability. When information gathering contributes to a lethal operation, the relationship between observation, intelligence analysis and the final decision to attack can be difficult to reconstruct from outside.
The report’s most valuable contribution is therefore not proof of a single sweeping conspiracy. It is a detailed account of how two men say they have operated in a secretive and dangerous environment-and of the uncertainty that surrounds their claims.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is anti-Putin sabotage?
Anti-Putin sabotage is a broad term for covert activity intended to undermine Putin’s government or Russian military capabilities. In the BBC investigation, it refers to alleged intelligence gathering and support for Ukrainian operations by Russian individuals who oppose the war.
Who are Ivan and Foma?
Ivan is a pseudonym for a Russian man who says he has supported Ukrainian intelligence from inside Russia. Foma is a Russian living in Poland who says he coordinates volunteers gathering information about Russian military personnel.
Did the BBC verify every claim in the investigation?
No. The BBC says the men’s accounts could not all be independently verified. Ukraine’s GUR confirmed that both men work with the agency, but that confirmation does not independently prove every operation they described.
Was Foma involved in the killing of General Fanil Sarvarov?
Foma told the BBC that his network had provided Ukrainian intelligence with information about Sarvarov before the general was killed in December 2025. The reporting does not establish that Foma’s network planned or carried out the killing.
How many Russians are involved in anti-Putin sabotage?
Foma estimated that 300 to 500 Russians may be involved in this kind of work, but the figure could not be independently verified. He separately described a network of about three dozen people.
Why is this activity dangerous?
People suspected of helping a foreign intelligence service can face arrest, prosecution and long prison sentences. The investigation also highlights the risk that sources may be compromised or may provide misleading information.
Conclusion: A Hidden and Uncertain Front
The BBC’s investigation into anti-Putin sabotage reveals the accounts of two Russian men who say they have helped Ukrainian intelligence gather information about military assets and personnel. Their testimony offers a rare glimpse into alleged covert activity during the Russia-Ukraine war.
At the same time, the report underlines the limits of what can be established publicly. The scale of the networks is uncertain, individual claims remain difficult to verify, and the connection between intelligence gathering and particular attacks requires careful examination.
As the war continues, the reported activities of people operating inside Russia and from exile are likely to remain a subject of scrutiny. For now, the investigation provides a detailed account of the claims made by Ivan and Foma-not a complete or independently verified map of Russia’s clandestine opposition networks.